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This article examines Stapleton's view that insurance has lacked influence and been 
no more than a 'makeweight' argument in the development of tort liability. Looking at 
the wider context, the article describes the overwhelming importance of insurers to 
the litigation system and argues that all cases are affected by insurance practice. It 
distinguishes the effect of insurance upon judicial fact finding, on the one hand, and 
the development of common law rules, on the other. It examines the ability of insurers 
to influence legislation relevant to the tort system. It concludes that, if account is 
taken of all these areas, insurance has been of vital importance to the law of tort. 
Without it, the system of personal injury compensation would not have survived. This 
conclusion is reached even though insurance is largely ignored by the great majority 
of tort texts. 
  
This article examines the effect of insurance upon the law of tort and, in particular, 
upon the system of personal injury compensation. What is the relationship, if any, 
between the rules of tort law, on the one hand, and the availability of insurance, on the 
other? It has been argued that judges appear more ready to impose liability when 
insurance enables the cost of compensation to be more widely distributed. Tort rules 
have been said to have been developed in favour of claimants, at least in situations 
where they have been less able to protect themselves by taking out their own first 
party insurance. Others have denied that there is any consistent pattern in the law 
which reflects such a close relationship with insurance. This article not only considers 
whether the common law or statutory rules have been affected in this way, but also 
looks at the institutional context within which tort law is practised and insurance 
functions. How important are insurers to the litigation system and what influences do 
they bring to bear? What effect do they have upon legislation? This wider, contextual 
perspective, in particular, distinguishes the analysis here from the few previous 
examinations of the topic. 
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The article begins by looking at this institutional context and the importance of 
insurers to the tort system in general. It then turns to an examination of the particular 
rules in tort. First, it sets out the general views of judges and academics concerning 
the effect of insurance upon the common law. Next it looks at specific areas of tort to 
consider whether these general views can be supported. The final section focuses upon 
insurers and the legislative process, and the effect insurance has had upon statute law. 
 
1. THE INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE OF INSURANCE 
There is no doubt that insurance profoundly influences the practical operation of 
the law of tort. Liability insurance is not merely an ancillary device to protect the 
insured, but is the “primary medium for the payment of compensation, and tort law 
[is] a subsidiary part of the process.”1 Although the majority of defendants in tort are 
individual people, they are almost all insured. In nine out of ten cases the real 
defendants are insurance companies, with the remainder comprising large self-insured 
organisations or public bodies. Only rarely are individuals the real defendants.
2
 
Instead policyholders cede control over their case to their insurer and thereafter 
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usually play little or no part in the litigation process.
3
 Insurers determine how the 
defence is to be conducted and, for example, commonly make admissions without the 
consent of the insured,
4
 and settle cases in spite of the policyholder’s objection.5 
Insurers pay out 94 per cent of tort compensation.
6
 Classic studies reveal that it is 
their bureaucracy that dictates much litigation procedure, and determines when, and 
for how much, claims are settled.
7
 It is their buildings, rather than courts of law, or 
even solicitors' offices,
8
 that are the important centres of tort practice. The number of 
such centres has declined recently because of company mergers and greater 
specialisation which has concentrated the work in particular areas. Consolidation in 
the liability market
9
 has resulted in it being dominated by only eight major companies, 
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although there are more than fifty other smaller firms issuing policies. All insurers 
have developed highly systematised approaches to claims handling, and make 
extensive use of information technology. They have increasingly structured their 
business, and closely monitor the performance of their claims handlers and lawyers. 
They have reduced the number of solicitors’ firms that act for them. Their standard 
procedures have been further refined, especially for smaller claims and “fast track” 
cases. Economic pressures mean that communication between the parties takes place 
on the telephone rather than via letters or face to face meetings, and the outcome of a 
claim is likely to be influenced as much by a computerised assessment as by the 
discretion of the claims handler involved.
10
 Although these generalisations about how 
litigation is conducted do not apply to all insurers for every type of case,
11
 they have a 
great effect upon the way in which tort rules are viewed and used in practice. 
Because insurers dominate the system, it is very difficult to view any tort case in 
isolation: each and every case is affected, no matter whether determined in court or 
out of it. Insurers' control over the litigation process has not been emphasised 
sufficiently when the effect of insurance upon individual cases and on tort rules has 
been considered. However, it is dealt with immediately here in order to place in a 
wider institutional framework the cases used as examples later in this article. 
Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system: they process the routine payments 
and they decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. It is unusual for 
them to contest liability
12
 and, as a result, they make at least some payment in 86 per 
                                                                                                                                            
transact motor insurance, only 65 companies and 11 Lloyds syndicates actively did so. The ten 
largest motor insurers controlled two thirds of the market. ABI Response to the Greenaway Review of 
Compulsory Motor Insurance and Uninsured Driving (London: ABI, 2004) annex B. 
10
 Goriely et al op cit 31 and 149. 
11
 Dingwall et al op cit. 
12
 Goriely et al op cit 103 found that insurers’ files “contained remarkably little discussion of liability,” 
finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases. 
 5 
cent of personal injury claims made against them.
13
 In the great majority of cases they 
pay not only compensation to claimants, but also the litigation costs of both sides. 
However, if an action fails the claimant may become liable for costs. To avoid this, 
loss insurers now offer claimants, after they have been injured, a policy which 
promises to pay their costs in the event of an unsuccessful claim. If the claim proves 
successful, the premium can even be added to the damages awarded in tort. Insurers 
may also offer legal expenses insurance in other contexts,
14
 and this can affect key 
aspects of the litigation.
15
 In particular, claimants cannot easily choose their own 
lawyer and may be required to use one from a panel approved by the insurer.
16
 The 
clients of these solicitors may receive a different service from those freely chosen by 
claimants, and conflicts of interest may arise.
17
 Insurers thus fund the tort system, 
control much of the representation, and can have an interest in whatever the outcome 
of a claim. 
Insurers determine the extent that lawyers become involved in disputes, and the 
tactics that are used in the proceedings. Increasingly cases are being settled at an early 
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stage, and without resort to the issue of court documents.
18
 Insurers decide, in 
particular, whether a case merits the very exceptional treatment of being taken to a 
court hearing.
19
 In effect, they allow trial judges to determine only one per cent of all 
the claims made. Only a few of these are appealed with the result that the senior 
judiciary are left to adjudicate upon a small fraction of what are, by then, very 
untypical cases. Whether an appeal court is to be given an opportunity to examine a 
point of tort law may depend upon the insurer for, if it serves the insurer's purpose for 
doubt to remain, the claimant can be paid in full and threatened with a costs award if 
the action is continued.
20
 In this sense tort principles themselves have been shaped by 
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and for insurers, even though there has been a significant growth in the power of 
claimant lawyers in the last twenty years.
21
 
Insurers’ influence upon settlements is even more pronounced than it is upon 
decided cases. For the lawyer asked by his client to advise on the merits of a claim it 
is the realities of the litigation system that are of concern rather than the formal rules 
of law. Practitioners would agree with the key analysis of Ross
22
 that the textbook 
rules of tort are often transformed when they come to be used in the system in three 
ways: firstly, they are simplified; secondly, they are made more liberal; and thirdly, 
they are made more inequitable. Simplification occurs because the rules are too 
uncertain when applied to the individual facts of particular accidents. For reasons of 
cost and administrative efficiency, insurers have been forced to substitute other 
criteria for the strict tort rules. Mechanical rules of thumb - such as the car running 
into the back of another always being found the one at fault - replace any detailed 
investigation into blame. There is neither the time nor resources to instruct experts to 
analyse the scene of each road accident and precisely measure its effect upon the 
individual claimant. Cases are disposed of on the basis of paperwork alone, and this 
may bear only a limited relationship to what actually occurred. The result of the cost 
pressures upon insurers is that more claims succeed than the strict rules of tort would 
allow. Many insurers pay something for claims which, on full investigation, would be 
without foundation. As a result 
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“… wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to 
the objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law 
would lead one to suppose.”23 
However, this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in favour 
of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used to illustrate the 
general inequalities in the legal system involves a “one-shotter” accident victim suing 
a “repeat player” insurer.24 Delay, uncertainty, financial need and other pressures 
cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would award. The eagerness 
of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the system is reflected in the 
fact that they have been found to be very keen to accept any formal offer made to them 
by the “risk neutral” insurer.25 Those who can withstand the pressures of litigation do 
better than those who cannot, with the result that those from a particular class or 
background are more likely to succeed.
26
 Those who suffer most are the severely 
injured. Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value claim scrutinised 
in detail and processed very differently from the average case which typically involves 
but a minor upset and little, if any, financial loss. Those seriously injured are much 
less likely to receive “full” compensation than those suffering minor injuries who, for 
a variety of reasons, are likely to be over-compensated.
27
 The overall result of the 
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settlement system is that rough and ready justice is dispensed, much influenced by 
insurance company personnel and procedures, and driven by the needs of the 
insurance industry. The system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited 
relationship to the portrayal of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook. 
The importance of insurers to the tort system is reflected in the fact that the claims 
which are brought closely match the areas where liability insurance is to be found. 
Thus road and work accidents predominate partly because those are the two major 
areas where tort insurance is compulsory.
28
 They constitute 86 per cent of all the 
claims brought for personal injury.
29
 They dominate the practice of tort even though 
they are relatively minor causes of disability and incapacity for work.
30
 Those 
suffering injury in areas not covered by insurance are extremely unlikely to obtain 
compensation. According to one study, whereas 1 in 4 road accident victims and 1 in 
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10 work accident victims gain compensation from tort, only 1 in 67 injured elsewhere 
do so.
31
 
The scope of the tort system is affected not only by those areas where liability 
insurance has been made compulsory, but also by the existence of alternative sources 
of compensation. What opportunities are there for resort to either welfare payments 
from public insurance, or policy monies from first party private insurance? The 
interrelationship of compensation systems cannot be discussed in detail here,
32
 but a 
couple of examples will suffice to demonstrate the potential effects of other insurance 
systems upon tort. The first example is a historical one and, in practice, resulted in the 
abandonment of tort law for the great majority of work injuries. It derives from the 
'election' rule whereby workers injured in the course of their employment had to 
choose either to sue in tort or to claim private insurance benefits on a no-fault basis 
from their employer. They could not obtain these insurance benefits and pursue an 
action in tort. For a variety of reasons employees overwhelmingly opted, or were 
pressed into receiving the no-fault benefits,
33
 leaving the tort system with a very 
limited role to play in the industrial field.
34
 Although this ‘employer privilege’ 
                                                 
31
 The Pearson Commission op cit vol 1 table 5. The study reveals that only 6.5 per cent of all accident 
victims incapacitated for three days of more are compensated by the tort system. However, if only 
serious injuries are considered tort becomes much more important. Where an accident causes 
incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of claimants receive tort damages. Harris 
et al op cit made similar findings concerning the limited importance of the tort system to accident 
victims in general. The significance of tort is reduced tenfold if account is taken of those suffering 
disablement not from accidents alone but from all causes, including congenital illness and disease. P. 
S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 100. 
32
 For a recent example see U. Magnus (ed), The Impact of Social Security Law on Tort Law (Vienna: 
Springer, 2003). 
33
 W. A. Dinsdale, History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain (London: Stone and Cox, 1954) 161. 
For judicial criticism of the “deplorable” and “extremely shabby” tactics used by insurers see Deane 
v H. F. Edwards & Co (1941) 34 BWCC 183. 
34
 P. W. J. Bartrip, Workmen's Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) 
chap 10. 
 11 
continues in North America, a few European countries, and increasingly in Australia, 
it was abolished in the UK in 1948.
35
 Tort claims for work accidents have since 
flourished, and now constitute over a third of all the actions brought.
36
 
A second example of the influence of insurance upon the extent to which resort is 
had to litigation involves private agreements between insurers to abandon the tort 
system in respect of certain losses. This may take various forms,
 37
 but the agreement 
which has come to public attention is the so called ‘knock for knock’ arrangement in 
relation to motor accidents.
38
 Although more reluctant to do so in recent years, motor 
insurers have set up a series of agreements with other insurers which have similar risk 
profiles concerning the extent to which they will litigate. In advance of any accident 
involving claimants covered by both first and third party insurance, they agree firstly, 
that each will indemnify the property damage suffered by its own policyholder; and 
secondly, that they will not use the tort system to reclaim any of this loss from the 
other party even if they were clearly responsible for the damage. Where an insurer 
suffers a loss as a result of this arrangement, it hopes to make up for it in a later case. 
Overall, insurers expect that matters will even themselves out. These agreements are 
made in order to avoid the excessive cost and uncertainty that would be involved if 
insurers were forced to use the tort system for all small claims. They result from the 
inter-relationship of first party insurance with the tort system. 
This influence of insurance upon the general pattern of tort liability is matched by 
its effect upon the level of compensation awarded. The principles upon which 
damages are assessed implicitly recognise that it is a company with a deep pocket that 
will pay and not an individual. Although most awards in tort are for very limited sums 
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- little more than £2,500 
39
 - there are very few individuals who could afford to pay the 
amounts required in serious injury cases. The justice of the case never merits an 
investigation into the limited means of the average person found liable because that 
person will not have to pay. If it were not for insurance there would be little hope of 
restoring the claimant to the pre-accident position in a serious injury case. It is 
doubtful whether we would even wish to attempt to place full responsibility for the 
damage on most defendants. The very nature of the tort system would have to change. 
Without insurance, it is probable that tort liability itself could not survive.
40
 
These facts about the tort system have been empirically established in a series of 
studies,
41
 but gain little prominence in tort textbooks.
42
 In spite of students being left 
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 This is the median figure in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 1996 - 97 in 
P. Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (London: Legal Aid Board Research Unit, 1998) 
40 fig 3.17. In 70 per cent of successful cases the damages were less than £5,000, although the 
overall average was £11,000. Fenn and Rickman, “Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997-2002” 
report average damages of only £3,000 for employers liability accident claims, although this study of 
almost 100,000 cases related only to claims for less than £15,000. See 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/majrep/claims/elclaims.htm . Datamonitor op cit 81 reports the average 
general liability personal injury claim in 2002 cost £4,407. In evidence to the Law Commission in 
1993 the Trades Union Council noted that the average sum obtained in the 150,000 union-backed 
cases in 1991 was under £2,000. 
40
 J. G. Fleming, The American Tort Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 21. Without insurance, 
the system “would long ago have collapsed under the weight of the demands put on it and been 
replaced by an alternative, and perhaps more efficient system of accident compensation.” J. G. 
Fleming, The Law of Torts (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 9
th
 ed 1998) 13. 
41
 Extensively referenced in D. Dewees, D. Duff, and M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident 
Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (Oxford: OUP, 1996). But see Saks, “Do We Really Know 
Anything about the Behaviour of the Tort Litigation System – and Why Not?” (1992) 140 U 
Pennsylvania L R 1147. 
42
 The major exception being P. Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London: 
Butterworths, 6
th
 ed 1999) especially chap 9. There is little useful discussion in the many student and 
practitioner texts with the exception of M. Jones, Textbook on Torts (Oxford: OUP, 8
th
 ed 2002) s.1.3 
and S. Deakin, A. Johnson and B. Markesinis, Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 5
th
 ed 2003). Although J. G. 
 13 
in ignorance, it cannot be denied that insurance in this context is fundamental to the 
general operation of the tort system. “Insurance ‘technology’ underlies the whole 
practice of tort law.”43 Over fifty years ago one writer concluded that the doctrines of 
tort law  
“… are horse and buggy rules in an age of machinery; and they might 
well have gone to the scrap heap some time ago had not the 
tremendous growth of liability insurance and the progressive ingenuity 
of the companies made it possible to get some of the benefits of social 
insurance under - or perhaps in spite of - the legal rules.”44 
 
It is to the rules that we now turn. 
 
 
 
2. THE VIEWS OF JUDGES AND ACADEMICS OF THE EFFECT OF 
INSURANCE 
In the first part of this article we concluded that insurers have had a major effect 
upon the general operation of the tort system. However, there is much more doubt 
about the extent that insurance can be shown to be a factor taken into account to 
determine the outcome of individual cases. To what extent have facts been interpreted 
to fit the established basis for liability, and the result thus manufactured perhaps for 
the benefit an uninsured claimant? More significant for the academic tort lawyer is the 
suggestion that, rather than the facts, it is the rules themselves that have been changed 
to accommodate the insurance position. 
                                                                                                                                            
Fleming, The Law of Torts (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 9
th
 ed 1998) 13 regards insurance as 
the cause of a vast expansion in liability and this “pervasive trend runs like a golden thread” 
throughout the book, he gives few examples of insurance having a direct effect. There are few 
insurance textbooks compared to tort, but they similarly avoid specific examination of the effect of 
insurance on tort liability. A notable exception is the excellent section in M. Clarke, Policies and 
Perceptions of Insurance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) chap 8. 
43
 J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 36. 
44
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LJ 549 at 569.  
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Why might this be done? We need not examine the economic, political and social 
arguments in detail here. However, in simple terms, some have argued that liability 
may more readily be imposed if the tort action is seen only as a means of 
compensating needy individuals, and the defendant is merely a conduit to an insurance 
fund and a means of distributing the cost of the injury to a wider pool. Conversely, if 
the claimant has his own insurance for the loss caused, his needs are less and liability 
may then be denied. ‘Who is insured?’ and ‘who is in the better position to insure?’ 
have thus been seen by some as key questions in determining liability issues. Whether 
it is economically more efficient for a loss to be met from first party insurance rather 
than from liability insurance via a tort claim raises wide issues. However, it is 
sufficient here to note that the relative insurability of the parties has been argued to be 
relevant when determining whether liability should be imposed. 
Judicial views  
In the past it was almost unknown for judges to examine or even acknowledge the 
existence of insurance relating to a claim, and it remains extremely unusual for them 
to do so. They have occasionally asserted that insurance has had no direct effect upon 
them, stating that it “is not the function of a court of law to fasten on the fortuitous 
circumstance of insurance to impose a greater burden” on the defendant than would 
otherwise be the case.
45
 However, their general silence about such matters has not 
prevented speculation about whether the wider arguments relating to insurability are 
having an unacknowledged effect. It is difficult for judges to discuss insurance factors 
openly - even if they consider them relevant - because they give rise to wide ranging 
policy considerations. In addition, if insurance were openly recognised as a 
determining factor, judges could be accused of deciding cases on the basis of the 
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parties' means alone, and the idea that a rich or protected litigant must always lose to a 
poor or needy one is too simplistic to contemplate. 
As an exception to the general rule, Lord Denning was more prepared to examine 
the insurance background to disputes but even he did so only occasionally. Most 
famously, in a case over thirty years ago involving a learner driver being sued by her 
instructor for negligent driving, he suggested that the presence of liability insurance 
could determine the standard of care to be applied. He thought that the skill of a fully 
qualified driver could be required from the learner driver partly because she carried 
liability insurance: 
“Parliament requires every driver to be insured against third party risks. 
The reason is so that a person injured by a motor car should not be left 
to bear the loss on his own, but should be compensated out of the 
insurance fund. The fund is better able to bear it than he can. But the 
injured person is only able to recover if the driver is liable in law. So 
the judges see to it that he is liable, unless he can prove care and skill 
of a high standard …. Thus we are … moving away from the concept: 
‘No liability without fault.’ We are beginning to apply the test: ‘On 
whom should the risk fall?’ Morally the learner driver is not at fault; 
but legally she is liable to be because she is insured and the risk should 
fall on her.”46  
Two years later he returned to the theme, pointing out that it was damages as well as 
liability that had been influenced: 
“The damages are expected to be borne by the insurers. The courts 
themselves recognise this every day. They would not find negligence 
so readily - or award sums of such increasing magnitude - except on 
the footing that the damages are to be borne, not by the man himself, 
but by an insurance company.”47 
Although the law reports contain no other statements as explicit as these, in the last 
fifteen years or so they have made increasing reference to insurance. Judges are more 
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prepared than in the past to discuss wider policy issues,
48
 and these have sometimes 
included insurance aspects.
49
 Within this broader framework judges have referred to 
distributive justice whereby account is taken of the effects of a decision beyond the 
immediate parties to the dispute. In a recent lecture Lord Steyn stated: 
“The primary aim of tort law is the pursuit of corrective justice. It 
requires somebody who has harmed another without justification to 
indemnify the other. There is, however, another perspective, namely 
considerations of distributive justice. It concentrates on the place of the 
plaintiff and the defendant in society…. Not surprisingly, our courts 
have not shut their eyes to such considerations: the insurance position 
of the parties has sometimes been treated as relevant.”50 
Insurance, therefore, may be taken into account but only “sometimes”. It is difficult to 
forecast when and with what effect. There is considerable uncertainty.  
Commentators’ views 
A Realist perspective upon the judicial role emphasises the importance of 
underlying policy considerations as against the formalist reasoning contained in the 
judgements themselves. Traditional judicial silence on insurance has provided a 
vacuum which a few tort scholars have sought to fill. Some have drawn inferences 
about the influence of insurance in spite the reasons expressly given in the 
judgements, whereas others have rejected such causal connections. There has been a 
                                                 
48
 K. Malleson, The New Judiciary: The Effects of Expansion and Activism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1999), R. Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 
2002), M. Kirby, Judicial Activism (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005, forthcoming).   
49
 For an Australian context see Gill, “The Expansion of Liability and the Role of Insurance - Who's the 
Chicken?” [1999] International J of Insurance Law 27. 
50
 Lord Steyn, “Perspectives of Corrective and Distributive Justice in Tort Law”" (2002) 23 Irish Jurist 
1. Similarly, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 at 83 he described the duty of 
care as “a mosaic in which the principles of corrective and distributive justice are interwoven.” Lord 
Hoffmann said that corrective justice “… has been abandoned in favour of a cautious pragmatism” in 
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 at 502. For the most recent 
discussion of distributive justice in an insurance context see J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 
 17 
sharp division in views. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the “hidden 
hand” of insurance has had a great effect;51 courts are said frequently “to treat tort as a 
compensation and loss-spreading scheme, via the pervasive phenomenon of liability 
insurance.”52 Judges may even be influenced without knowing it because insurance 
“acts as a stimulus to decision-making whether or not the decision-maker is 
consciously aware of it.”53 The result, according to Cane, is that “there can be little 
doubt that the development of the law has been influenced by the growing prevalence 
of liability insurance.”54 Another textbook agrees: 
“… [T]here is no denying the fact that, as a result of modern insurance 
practices, the notions of 'duty' (and causation) are at times used to 
conceal insurance dictates and the term 'negligence' is employed in 
contexts where the defendant could not humanly have avoided the 
accident in question.”55  
Even if the rules themselves have not directly been affected, insurance may thus 
“invisibly” influence the result in a particular case.56 
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On the other hand, others have argued that the effect of insurance has been 
exaggerated and that in fact it has had little effect on tort rules themselves. Prosser’s 
view, over thirty years ago, was that  
“While liability insurance undoubtedly has had an effect, it is difficult 
to escape the impression that all this has been very much overstated. A 
dispassionate observer, if such a one is to be found in this area, might 
… conclude that the 'impact' of insurance upon the law of torts has 
been amazingly slight; that most of the changes that have been pointed 
out are due to other causes….”57 
Similarly, Clarke today argues that influence - in the sense that the law has been 
tailored to fit the insurance position - is scarcely to be seen at all.
58
 
In examining these issues Stapleton has written a key article.
59
 She argues that any 
causal link between the development of insurance and the expansion of tort liability 
must be viewed with caution. Echoing the words of Prosser, she concludes that when 
courts refer to insurance they do so only as a ‘makeweight’ factor after it has been 
decided to impose liability for other reasons. She points to tort rules which appear to 
be entirely unaffected by insurance factors, and argues that commentators have used 
the argument selectively to explain certain developments while ignoring other areas. 
There has been no fundamental shift in the formal basis of tort law such as might have 
been expected if insurance were to provide a new foundation for its development. The 
formal rules still usually require proof of fault, and the failure to move decisively 
towards a stricter liability is evidence of the limited effect of insurance. Finally, 
Stapleton is concerned that if attention is paid only to insurability, the potential 
deterrent or corrective role of tort will be suppressed. Even though many will not 
share the belief that, in practice, tort has much effect in controlling behaviour or 
achieving deterrence, and many may doubt that the tort system produces results which 
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have such a high claims to justice, nevertheless they will agree that it is a mistake to 
place too much emphasis upon tort law as a means of compensation. Tort is but one of 
a number of compensation options available, or which might be developed.
60
 
In spite of her criticisms, Stapleton acknowledges that insurance is clearly relevant 
to “the operation of tort law in daily life.” This includes its effect upon who sues, and 
the dynamics of the settlement process. In addition, she agrees that judges are fully 
aware that it is the insurer who pays, and, at a very general level, it is likely that courts 
have been influenced. However, she casts doubt upon more specific claims that link 
the expansion of tort liability with the availability of liability insurance. 
Although there is much to agree with here,
61
 it is not always easy in practice to 
draw the distinctions upon which the analysis relies. In particular, it can be difficult to 
isolate individual decision making from the institutional framework of the tort system. 
Stapleton accepts, but does not expand upon, the influence of insurance on the 
“operation of tort law in daily life.” This was discussed in more detail at the beginning 
of this article where it was suggested that insurers' control and administration of the 
tort system affects all claims. In particular, later in this article it is argued that the 
pervasive influence of insurance becomes clearer if the focus changes from 
establishing liability to assessing damages. Restoring the victim to the pre-accident 
position becomes inconceivable in serious injury cases in the absence of a mechanism 
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for distributing the cost of doing so. In this sense each award of substantial damages 
reflects the importance of insurance to the tort system. Finally, even if we accept that 
tort rules themselves have not been changed substantially by insurance we might still 
conclude that, in determining the facts of a particular case, judges have been 
“invisibly” affected by knowledge of the insurance position. The “sympathetic factor” 
at trial is known to litigators, and is what Clarke calls the “magnetic effect” of money 
whereby the result is influenced by any deep pocket in a case.
62
 Fitting the facts, rather 
than the law, to the insurance position limits the value of Stapleton's analysis. 
Conclusion 
All commentators therefore agree that insurance undoubtedly has had some 
influence upon tort; it is only the extent of this influence that is open to question. Here 
it is argued that that influence has been substantial. Not only has insurance had a 
profound effect upon the operation of the claims system in general, but it has also 
influenced individual cases. Practitioners are aware that insurance is one of the factors 
that may determine the inferences to be drawn from the facts of the case. It competes 
with corrective justice and the moral basis of the fault principle in this regard to 
produce a tension which cannot be reconciled. Sometimes the insurance factor and the 
need for compensation will triumph, and negligence will be found where none 
existed; but occasionally the absence of fault will prevent the claim from succeeding. 
The morality of the fault principle still has a great effect upon determining liability, 
but the general effect of insurance becomes more pronounced when damages for 
serious injury are being assessed. 
Whether the rules of tort themselves have been changed to reflect insurance is more 
difficult to establish. On the one hand, it is certainly true that the foundations of tort 
remain largely unchanged. Formally, liability still depends upon proof of fault and, 
even where rules have been revised more in favour of claimants, it is too easy to 
suggest that insurance is the cause. On the other hand, some judges have 
acknowledged that they have concerned themselves with who has the deeper pocket, 
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or who was in the better position to distribute, or absorb, a loss. It is difficult to 
conclude that loss distribution arguments have influenced only the facts found and 
not, to some degree, the rules applied. However, substantial change in tort rules has 
not occurred. Instead it is the overall involvement of insurers with the system which 
leads us to conclude that insurance has had a major effect. 
Ought Insurance to Have Influence?  
Discussion of whether liability rules and the tort system in general have been 
influenced by insurance must be distinguished from whether rules should be so 
influenced. As soon as we start discussing law reform, we cannot focus only upon the 
distributive effects between the class of victims and the class of wrongdoers. Instead 
we must also take account of the majority of injured people who are presently left 
completely outside of the tort system. Whether, for all these people, compensation is 
better paid via tort liability as opposed to first party loss insurance or state welfare 
payments depends upon the political, moral and economic prisms through which the 
question is viewed.
63
 ‘Should the state play a greater role in dealing with misfortune?’ 
invites a wide range of responses. The extent that tort system should be seen as only 
providing corrective and not distributive justice reflects wider political and moral 
perspectives.
64
 It is, however, essential that that debate be informed by knowledge of 
what the tort system actually achieves in practice. 
Even within a narrower focus, the argument that the reality of insurance and 
insurability should be taken into account is a very imprecise one. Whose insurability 
should we focus upon? By what criteria are we to determine who is the ‘better’ or 
cheaper insurer when both sides will nearly always be able to purchase cover at some 
price? By concentrating on insurability we may divert attention from deterrence and 
whether market forces may have a role to play via tort in affecting risk taking 
behaviour, although the scope for such a possibility has been much exaggerated often 
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because of its very failure to take into account how insurance actually operates. 
Description of the influence that insurance has had must therefore be distinguished 
from the prescriptive effect that others might wish it to have. In contrast to the 
conclusion we reached above that insurance has had a major influence upon the tort 
system, and has had at least some part to play upon individual decision making, the 
view here is that it will not be possible to reach any general agreement on the role that 
it ought to play. 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF TORT LAW  
These general views of the effect of insurance are now considered in the context of 
specific areas of tort law. Although covering disparate caselaw, this section offers 
more detailed illustrations of the arguments which have been made previously. 
Procedure 
Insurers are closely consulted and involved in making rules of civil procedure. 
These rules permeate the tort system and bring it to life. The Civil Procedure Rules 
1998, eight pre-action protocols,
65
 and fixed costs agreements
66
 were the result of 
lengthy negotiation between interested parties, and insurers played a major part. In 
particular, insurers attitudes towards conditional fee agreements and their readiness to 
embark upon satellite litigation to contest the ability of claimants' lawyers to bring 
claims has had major effects upon use of tort law. For example, those suffering from 
industrial disease are now much less likely to obtain representation, and they will find 
it even more difficult to obtain compensation than they did previously.
67
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Although fee arrangements have been sanctioned which clearly take insurance into 
account, in a number of other respects the formal rules of procedure have ignored 
insurance. For example, until they were effectively abolished in 1934, juries were used 
to a greater or lesser extent to determine tort cases, and there was a rule of practice at 
the Bar that a jury was not to be told about the insurance position.
68
 This rule 
countered the fear that liability might be imposed too readily if laymen were aware 
that an individual defendant was insured. Previously it was said to be difficult to get a 
fair hearing from a jury especially in a motor accident case.
69
 The rule has no part to 
play today because the judge, sitting alone, will be aware from his own experience 
that insurers are likely to be party to the great majority of tort cases that come before 
him. Commenting upon the old rule one judge said:  
“…[T]hose days are long past. Everyone knows that all prudent 
professional men carry insurance, and the availability and cost of 
insurance must be a relevant factor ….”70  
Another example of where the legal system refuses to acknowledge the presence of 
insurance is embedded in the doctrine of subrogation. Standing in its client’s shoes, an 
insurer has a right to defend the claim or bring an action to recoup monies it is liable 
to pay out under a policy. This involvement in litigation via subrogation is 
accomplished by using not the name of the insurer itself, but that of its policyholder 
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alone. As a result the law reports are replete with what are fictitious actions, and 
students are often left with little indication of the importance of insurance to the civil 
system.
71
 The press and public are similarly left in ignorance of the insurance 
background. This cloak of anonymity has only rarely attracted the criticism it merits.
72
 
Procedural problems can be caused by failing to recognise the role of insurers. For 
example, it may be necessary to serve documents directly upon the defendant himself. 
The insurance company may not suffice.
73
 In particular, the Motor Insurers Bureau, 
which administers the reserve funds for motor vehicle accidents involving uninsured 
or unidentified drivers, has been able take considerable advantage of the technicalities 
resulting from the requirements of service.
74
 To avoid some of the procedural 
difficulties, sometimes it has been necessary to create special rules. For example, even 
though a defendant company is no longer in existence it is now possible for it to be 
restored to the register of companies solely in order for it to be sued.
75
 Its old insurer 
cannot then avoid liability for injuries only because it has been dissolved. However, 
there are difficulties even with this procedure,
76
 and further problems are still caused 
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by the fact that an individual defendant and not an insurer is technically the party to 
the action. 
The Duty of Care 
The duty concept acts as the gatekeeper of the law of tort insofar as it determines 
whether novel claims are to proceed further. Taking into account wider policy factors, 
judges can rule out claims for which there may be no precedent. Policy concerns such 
as the danger of encouraging a flood of claims and placing an excessive burden upon 
defendants have been most discussed in relation to the duty concept. However, judges 
have examined less often the secondary consequence of such a danger – the difficulty 
of insuring against a very wide liability. Stapleton argues that such a factor is distinct 
from the morality of imposing an indeterminate liability, and that insurance 
difficulties alone have been of little importance in decision making. This is because, 
firstly, she believes that, where a duty has been found, insurance has only been used as 
a superfluous additional argument for doing so; and secondly, where a duty has been 
denied, insurance tends to be ignored even though it may be clear that the defendant 
could protect himself against the liability. 
By contrast, it has been argued that the scope of the duty of care expanded directly 
in relation to the increasing availability of liability insurance from 1880, and it 
contracted following insurance fears after 1984.
77
 In response Stapleton states that this 
causal connection can only be made in a very broad sense for, although there were 
several major fluctuations in liability over the century, there was no equivalent ebb 
and flow of insurance to account for them. As an illustration, the case that heralded 
the judicial retrenchment of the 1980’s may actually have ignored the insurance 
position.
78
 
 
This is because the decision severely curtailed liability for causing 
economic loss, 
 
even though it was probable that liability insurance was actually 
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available to cover that loss, or would have been made available if required.
79
 Such 
insurance exists in other European countries.
80
 
However, there are cases where insurance has been specifically taken into account. 
Distribution of loss arguments have been considered particularly relevant where 
economic loss has been claimed.
81
 In one such case, when considering the general 
principles to be applied to determine whether a duty of care existed, a judge discussed 
at length how his decision might be affected by broad views of the economic 
consequences.
82
 Two specific illustrations of the effect of insurance in a particular 
case can be given. In the first, a classification surveyor, employed by shipowners, was 
held to owe no duty of care to those having an interest in the cargo.
83
 In part this was 
because the court considered their irrecoverable loss was “readily insurable.” The 
second case concerned the liability of a surveyor of property engaged by a mortgagor. 
He was held liable for his survey to the purchaser of the property who, although not 
directly commissioning the report, had relied upon it. In preventing the surveyor from 
disclaiming a duty of care, one judge said that the risk of the surveyor’s negligence 
would be distributed among all house purchasers through an increase in his fees to 
cover insurance, rather than allowing the whole of the risk to fall upon the one 
unfortunate purchaser.
84
 These distributional consequences can be hard to assess, and 
reveal the wide scope for potential discussion. Fearful of this, and in order to limit 
                                                 
79
 Clarke op cit at 277 and 286. 
80
 Ibid. Contrast the generally limited provision in European countries described in Van Boom et al, 
Tort and Insurance Law: Pure Economic Loss (Vienna: Springer, 2004) especially at 200. 
81
 See cases cited in S. Deakin, et al op cit at 144 et seq. 
82
 Hoffmann J in Morgan Crucible Co v Hill Samuel [1991] Ch 295 at 302.  
83
 Marc Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211 at 241. 
84
 Lord Griffiths in Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 at 859. 
 27 
speculation, other judges have asked for clear evidence to be presented on matters 
such as uninsurability.
85
 
Conflicting judicial views about the relevance of insurance can be illustrated by 
reference to two recent cases involving injuries suffered when taking part in sport. In 
the first, insurance was thought relevant to whether a rugby referee owed a duty of 
care to the players in the game over which he had control. The court accepted that its 
decision was affected not only by the availability of liability insurance, but also by the 
countervailing consideration of the ability of the players to take out their own accident 
insurance.
86
 A duty of care was found, with the insurance position being a 
‘makeweight,’ but relevant, argument. By contrast, in the second case, although again 
a duty was found, insurance was deemed irrelevant. A duty of care towards a boxer 
was imposed on the non-profit making Board that governed boxing, and its insurance 
and financial difficulties that might result were ignored.
87
  
Where, as in most cases, insurance is not discussed, a few tort commentators still 
speculate whether it might help to explain a court decision. For example, it has been 
held that an ambulance service owes a duty of care to those it has been called to 
attend.
88
 However, the fire service owes no such duty in responding to its emergency 
calls.
89
 One textbook comments: 
 “If there is to be a difference between the cases, it seems better to 
realise that it lies in the fact that the fire service is primarily concerned 
with saving property and that imposing liability would tend to enure for 
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the benefit of subrogated fire insurers who have taken a premium to 
cover the risk ….”90 
By contrast, the person who suffered brain damage as a result of the failure of the 
ambulance to arrive was unlikely to carry first party insurance against such an injury. 
It is impossible to disprove the view that insurance may have had an effect upon these 
decisions, but it can be hazardous to make other than to make a speculative 
connection as the above textbook writer did. Such connections are not far-fetched; but 
in the individual case they remain unproven. 
Fault, Strict Liability and the Standard of Care 
The standard of care has been said to be affected by insurance because judges have 
a wide discretion to interpret what may be expected of the reasonable man. They can 
demand a very high level of care and, in effect, impose strict liability through the 
fiction of fault. The standard of care can be made more objective by being divorced 
from the particular circumstances, and excuses, of the defendant, as where a learner 
driver is held to the standard of care of a fully qualified driver. 
Although it is tempting to assert that it is insurance that accounts for these high 
standards, other explanations are possible. For example, one judge recently 
acknowledged that the great care required of motorists merely reflected the fact that 
the car is a very dangerous weapon and the pedestrian very vulnerable.
91
 Moreover, it 
is clear that the scope of liability does not correspond to the extent of potential 
protection provided by insurance. Firstly, as a modern example we might note that the 
standard of care required of doctors has not been stretched to exceptional levels in 
spite of the availability of insurance or other means to distribute the cost. Secondly, it 
must be remembered that in the nineteenth century defendants were held liable for 
extensive damage long before liability insurance became readily available from 
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around 1880.
92
 The formal rules of tort then offered considerable scope for the 
imposition of strict liability long before there were ideas that this might be 
economically efficient or that losses might be channelled into deeper pockets. 
Although the liability insurance market became well established in the early part of 
the twentieth century, it was the fault principle, rather than strict liability, that came to 
dominate the formal law. The loss spreading and insurance rationales of strict liability 
were largely abandoned by the common law after a landmark case in 1946, which saw 
the triumph of fault.
93 
Thereafter strict liability could usually only be found where 
courts labelled as fault those acts which were far from being so in reality. Although 
statute has imposed some strict liability, it is limited and, apart from in work accident 
cases, and for some aspects of economic loss,
94
 it has had little practical effect. 
Insurance therefore has not resulted in the widespread development of rules of strict 
liability. 
The fault principle continues to thrive in spite of the growth of insurance. A claim 
will fail unless fault is proven no matter how much insurance the defendant carries. 
For example, no damages are payable as a result of an accident in which the driver 
dies of a heart attack before the collision occurs, or where the driver is suddenly 
affected by an illness of which he had no prior knowledge.
95
 Not only will there be no 
liability in tort, but there can be no claim on any reserve fund. Strict liability has been 
imposed for many work accidents where statute prescribes the standard of care 
required. However, it is still possible for a defendant to avoid liability by arguing that 
the statute requires proof of fault, or that its breach was not the cause of the injury to 
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the claimant. A couple of very recent cases illustrate this. The failure to provide a safe 
working platform as prescribed by statute was held not to be the cause of injury when 
the claimant fell from the platform as a result of it being deliberately toppled in anger 
by a workmate.
96
 Similarly, even though an employer supplied safety boots that 
contained a hole and caused the claimant to suffer frostbite, there was no liability 
because this was not a risk against which the steel-capped boots were intended to 
guard.
97
 Although insurance undoubtedly influenced the imposition of strict liability 
upon employers in the first place, it is but part of a complex mixture of factors 
determining whether damages will be paid. In many cases the morality behind the 
fault principle, or the notion of responsibility, has sufficient strength to override the 
fact that the defendant is insured. Insurance has brought about no sea change in the 
formal basis of liability and its influence is partial at best.    
Causation 
Although drawing a line to liability based on causation is open to wide ranging 
influences, cases that specifically refer to insurance are few indeed. Even in a major 
recent case dealing with injury by asbestos where the amounts of compensation at 
stake were exceptional and policy issues to the fore, insurance was not mentioned.
98
 
This has not prevented commentators from suggesting that the hidden hand of 
insurance might explain the very generous view of causation taken in a number of 
personal injury cases where liability has been imposed for freak accidents or bizarre 
results.
99
 However, again the influence of insurance is inconsistent for it is possible to 
point to cases that have adopted a less generous approach. Some claimants have been 
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denied despite their need of compensation, and even though the defendant was not 
only at fault but also insured. 
Insurance has been said to be a factor in certain cases where the causation rules 
have been applied in a restricted way to provide for only a very limited liability in 
relation to property damage.
100
 Claimants are much more likely to carry first party 
insurance for such damage than they are to be insured against personal injury. Lord 
Hoffmann recently stated: 
“Property insurance is relatively cheap and accessible; in my opinion 
people should be encouraged to insure their own property rather than 
seek to transfer the risk to others by means of litigation, with the heavy 
transactional costs which that involves.”101 
However, in the same case Lord Hobhouse denied that insurance should affect 
principles of liability: 
“The argument that insurance makes the rule unnecessary is no more 
valid than saying that, because some people can afford to and sensibly 
do take out comprehensive car insurance, no driver should be civilly 
liable for his negligent driving.” 
In an earlier case, Lord Denning, following the Hoffmann reasoning, explicitly 
argued that no liability should be imposed, and there should be a break in the chain of 
causation, partly because the claimant could have relied on first party insurance 
against property damage.
102
 In fact, the judge may have been wrong in this for the 
property had been empty for some time and, as a result, no insurance may have been 
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in force.
103
 The case may illustrate that when courts try to take wider factors into 
account they may find the position more complex than at first appears. They may lack 
the technical evidence required, and their speculation about the insurance position 
may prove quite wrong.
104
  
Defences 
It is possible to view certain cases in which courts have refused to apply defences 
which would deprive the claimant of all or part of the damages as being influenced by 
the insurance position. For example, the ability to pay is said to account for cases in 
which the tiredness of a worker which helps to cause his own injury is held not to 
constitute contributory negligence, and his damages are not then reduced. By contrast, 
the tiredness which results in injury to another worker, and for which the employer 
could be vicariously liable, is held to be negligence.  
However, courts never refer to insurance specifically in this context, and the 
argument again depends on cases being determined by hidden factors and accepting 
that its effect on the law, at best, is partial. On the one hand, insurance may have 
influenced both judges and Parliament in that they have restricted the scope of the 
defence of consent in areas where insurance is compulsory. For example, in motor 
accidents a statute prevents a passenger’s claim from being defeated by any express or 
implied agreement he may have made with the driver.
105
 This means that his claim 
cannot be defeated by a notice in the vehicle disclaiming any liability. Similarly for 
work accidents, judges have determined that where an employer is in breach of his 
statutory duty the claim against him cannot be avoided by pleading that the worker 
consented to the state of affairs. On the other hand, however, it must be emphasised 
that contributory negligence continues to be applied frequently in personal injury 
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claims, reducing damages in about a quarter of all cases that are settled.
106
 In a recent 
case damages were reduced by as much as 60 per cent in spite of the defendant being 
in breach of statutory duty.
107
 Furthermore, even the defence of consent survives in a 
handful of cases to defeat a claim from those who are extremely foolhardy, such as the 
passenger who chose to take a joyride in a plane, rather than a car, with a pilot with 
whom he had consumed a great deal of alcohol.
108
 The morality of the fault principle 
is hard to eradicate in such a case, no matter what the level of insurance. 
In one case, although consent failed as a defence involving a claim for occupier's 
liability, warning notices displayed at the behest of the liability insurer were held to be 
effective to deny a duty of care to a spectator at a motor race.
109
 The case is especially 
notable for the dissent of Lord Denning who, because of the insurance factor, would 
have allowed damages. He thought that the insurer’s warning notices should have 
been ineffective because insurers should not be allowed to take the premiums and yet 
avoid the liability. However, the other judges did not share his analysis. A statute was 
later passed which today may enable such a claim to succeed. It prevents an occupier 
of business premises from excluding liability for death or personal injury to visitors. 
However, an exclusion relating to property damage is allowed if it is reasonable. One 
of the factors affecting this, and specified in the statute, is the availability of 
insurance.
110
  
Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability has been justified on the basis that it enables losses to be borne 
by those with deeper pockets, and that employers are better placed to make insurance 
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provision.
111
 Although these justifications may help account for some aspects of the 
liability, again they will not suffice to justify the full scope of the rule. For example, 
there is usually no vicarious liability for the acts of independent contractors even 
though the needs of the claimant and the ability of the employer to insure may be the 
same. Nor is there liability if the employee acts outside the course of his employment. 
Even where recent decisions appear to impose a stricter liability, judges do not refer to 
insurance as a factor.
112
 It cannot be asserted that there is a direct correlation between 
the availability of insurance and the imposition of vicarious liability when the basic 
rule is subject to such major exceptions for which insurance cannot account. Stapleton 
stresses this point, and argues that the wide approval of the vicarious liability limits 
undermines the relevance of insurability as a factor in tort law.
113
 However, although 
it cannot be viewed as a sole factor, insurance cannot be discounted as an influence 
upon the expansion in liability. 
In a vicarious liability case in 1957 a court notably refused to take insurance into 
account and this led to measures being taken to avoid its result.
114
 The insurer of the 
employer found vicariously liable successfully reclaimed the damages for which it 
was responsible from the negligent employee who had caused the accident. Although 
the action was brought via subrogation in the name of the employer, it was pursued 
against the employer’s wishes. Employers generally were opposed to such recovery by 
insurers. Together with trade unions, they considered that it would be bad for 
industrial relations if responsibility for shop-floor accidents were to be transferred to 
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uninsured employees in this way. As a result, after the case they came to a private 
agreement with insurers’ representatives that subrogation would not be used in this 
way again.
115
 The full effects of the fault system were therefore abandoned in practice. 
Although this was achieved without judicial assistance,
116
 the result is that it is 
insurers, and never employees, who pay the tort bill.  
Insurance has recently been discussed in cases involving the potential liability of 
those who employ independent contractors. In order to take advantage of the usual 
rule which would result in no liability provided that it was reasonable to employ the 
contractor in question and steps were taken to ensure his competence, it was argued 
that the employer should inquire whether the contractor carried liability insurance. In 
one case a majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that such an inquiry should be made 
even if the contractor appeared otherwise competent, at least if he were to perform 
hazardous work. However, the scope of this duty was severely limited: it did not 
extend to checking the terms of the policy itself, or to discovering whether the policy 
was still current. As a result, on the facts of the case, the occupier was held not liable 
for a negligent fairground contractor who had recently allowed his liability insurance 
to expire.
117
 
In this case Sedley LJ strongly dissented from the view that there should be a duty 
to check for insurance in relation to a contractor who, in other respects, may appear 
reasonable to appoint. He feared that to create an independent duty to check for 
insurance would be a major extension of liability, and that this should not be done 
without more detailed information about the social and economic impact.
118
 He 
commented that the test for establishing a duty of care was as much a restrictive as an 
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expansive test, and could be used “to keep in check the tendency of contemporary 
western tort law to creep towards a situation in which anyone can sue anyone for 
anything.” Sedley's argument may have had some effect for, in a later case, the Court 
of Appeal restricted the relevance of insurance to liability. It decided that, in the 
absence of special circumstances, there should be no free-standing duty to check 
insurance.
119
 On the facts of the case, therefore, there was no liability for the 
negligence of a contractor who had been approved by the local authority to carry out 
the task in question. 
Assessment of Damages  
Contrary to the impression that may be gained from a tort textbook, it is quantum 
rather than liability that is the more important issue for a practitioner. Insurers are far 
more likely to contest the amount of damages claimed rather than whether there has 
been a breach of duty. Arguments that the defendant did not cause the injury or owed 
no duty of care are rare indeed. Too little attention has been paid by academics to the 
damages award. It should be a focus of concern not only when the efficacy of the tort 
system as a whole is being discussed, but also when the justice of any tort rule is being 
scrutinised. The debate about the influence of insurance upon tort similarly reflects 
too little concern about the damages award. 
It is clear that, at least in cases of serious personal injury, “the size of damages 
awards … is explicable only on the basis that judges are influenced by the widespread 
presence of insurance.”120 This is a major point. The extraordinarily high level of 
damages all paid in one lump sum is the feature of the tort system that distinguishes it 
from welfare and other compensation systems. Liability insurance enables tort to 
espouse its distinctive rhetoric: it purports to make an assessment of loss that is not 
only tailored to the individual claimant, but sufficient to restore the position before 
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injury took place. These claims are greatly overstated,
121
 and yet form much of the 
reason for tort’s existence. Without a mechanism to distribute the cost of imposing 
liability, it would rarely be worth assessing damages in the way we do at present in 
serious injury claims. Without insurance it is doubtful whether the tort system would 
survive at all. Insurance in this sense provides the lifeblood of tort. 
In recent years major changes have been made to the assessment of damages, and 
many of these are predicated upon payment being made either by insurers, or other 
large self-insured bodies. The assessment of damages has become ever more precise. 
Actuarial and forensic accountancy evidence has become commonplace. Such matters 
as the discount rate for early receipt of damages,
122
 the interest rate on delayed 
payment,
123
 and the inflation factor enabling past awards to be compared with those of 
the present day have all been more closely linked to the wider financial world. In a 
few serious injury cases lump sum payment has been replaced in part by a structured 
settlement, a reform prompted, manufactured and, until recently, controlled by 
insurers and insurance intermediaries.
124
 However, courts now have the power to 
order that damages take this periodic form even if the parties object.
125
 It is impossible 
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to conceive of such developments - involving continuing lifetime obligations to make 
increasing payments - if it were not for the fact that individuals almost never pay tort 
damages themselves. The argument here is that it is not easy to divorce these changing 
rules on assessment and payment of damages from the fact that it is insurers who run 
the tort system. 
Insurance monies can have had a direct effect upon the assessment of damages. In 
examining the extent that damages take account of collateral benefits, whether 
deriving from private or public sources, a trend can be discerned towards preventing 
claimants obtaining double compensation.
126
 For example, in one of a series of cases 
which deducted various types of social security benefit from damages, a judge 
recognised the reality that damages are met from insurance premiums, and to allow a 
claimant to recover twice, at the expense of insurers, could not be justified.
127
 
Following the institution of statutory scheme in 1990, social security benefits are now 
recovered by the state from damages awards. Insurers are required to deduct benefits 
from any tort compensation they pay, and reimburse the state. However, no account is 
taken of any private insurance from which the claimant benefits
128
 unless it relates to a 
policy paid for by his employer alone and to which the claimant has made no 
contribution.
129
 It is therefore still common for over-compensation to take place. For 
example, in two thirds of the cases where negligence causes death, the estate benefits 
from receipt of life insurance monies in addition to tort damages.
130
 Private insurance 
is therefore usually ignored by the tort system, whereas public insurance is now 
almost always deducted from damages, and this has reduced the incentive to sue in 
tort. 
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Apart from this example, the extent that insurance influences damages in particular 
cases, as opposed to the system in general, is much less clear. In the USA, individual 
damages awards have clearly been affected by insurance policy limits. There is 
evidence that lawyers do not pursue claims beyond these limits in order to obtain 
“blood money” from defendants personally.131 However, in the UK the policy limits 
for a claim are almost never relevant,
132
 and therefore it is less easy to see the precise 
effect of insurance cover. As in other areas, judges have expressed different views 
concerning the relevance of insurance and this results in much uncertainty. Their 
diversity of approach can be illustrated by three leading appellate cases. Although they 
all mention insurance, in only one of them was there any detailed discussion of the 
wider effects on society of substantially increasing damages, and in the first of them 
the relevance of insurance was emphatically denied. 
In this first case damages were sought for the care freely given by a spouse to his 
loved one following her serious injury.
133
 It was established law that such a claim 
could be made even though the husband did not charge his wife for the help he gave 
her. However, the complicating factor was that the wife’s injury had been caused by 
the husband's own negligence. He was thus both tortfeasor and carer. The court held 
that his wife could not succeed in her claim for the cost of care that he had freely 
given. A tortfeasor could not be expected to pay twice for the injury by not only giving 
the care, but then also having to pay for it. The claimant had argued that this ignored 
the reality that it was the husband's insurer that would pay, not the husband himself. 
However, the House of Lords rejected the relevance of insurance, and its views were 
supported by the Law Commission for the “danger otherwise is that decisions as to 
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where liabilities should be imposed will be made on the basis of who happens to be 
insured.”134   
In the second of the cases, the court again took a conservative line with regard to 
the relevance of insurance when it substantially increased compensation to allow more 
precisely for the return on investment of a lump sum award of damages. Actuarial 
evidence showed that previously claimants had been under-compensated because they 
had been expected to obtain an unrealistic rate of interest. To pay for the increase in 
damages the court recognised that insurance premiums would have to rise. “Whether 
this was something which the country can afford is not a subject on which your 
Lordships were addressed. So we are not in a position to form any view as to the 
wider consequences.”135 Any change to the rule that the defendant had to pay damages 
in full could only be made by Parliament “which, unlike the judges, is in a position to 
balance the many social, financial and economic factors which would have to be 
considered….”136   
By contrast, in the final case, evidence of the wider consequences of raising 
damages for non-pecuniary loss was presented to the court, and had considerable 
effect upon the outcome.
137
 Although involving questions of social policy, the level of 
damages was not thought a matter for Parliament alone. However, the court drew a 
distinction between its role in a claim for pecuniary as opposed to non-pecuniary loss: 
for pecuniary loss, the court was only required to make the correct calculation, and 
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economic consequences were irrelevant; whereas for non-pecuniary loss, the court 
was concerned with what was fair, just and reasonable, and the impact upon society 
was then a relevant factor. The court was to avoid setting damages “at a level which 
would materially affect the cost of living or disturb the current social pattern….”138 As 
a result it was important to consider how the insurance industry might be affected by 
any change. In addition, the consequences for the National Health Service (NHS) in 
paying for the effects of clinical negligence had to be considered. Various parties 
submitted written evidence to the court giving details of the effect on insurance 
premiums of a change in the way damages are assessed. They also dealt with the 
consequences for the NHS if its resources were to be depleted by increasing awards of 
compensation. Although these matters were discussed in general terms in the 
judgement itself, there was no examination of the detailed calculations. Nevertheless a 
decision was reached which was broadly favourable to defendants: although damages 
for pain and suffering were increased by up to a third in the most serious injury cases, 
no increase was made for the mass of claims involving minor injury. Compared to the 
Law Commission's proposal for a substantial increase in damages for a much broader 
range of cases,
139
 this change caused insurers little difficulty. The Commission had 
attached much less importance than the court to the wider consequences for society 
and had not considered cost to be relevant. Although the court tried to confine the 
wider ranging arguments to non-pecuniary loss cases, it was directly influenced by the 
impact of any change in assessment upon insurance. 
Wider ranging factors which might influence damages for personal injury were also 
discussed in a case which considered whether such awards must be considered as 
comparators when damages for defamation are assessed.
140
 In deciding that 
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comparison need not always be made, Lord Hoffmann noted that damages for 
personal injury, unlike those for defamation, are almost always paid by insurers or out 
of public funds and, as he stated elsewhere, “spread across the whole community by 
an intricate series of economic links.”141 The exemplary and deterrent effects of such 
damages are minimal or non-existent. The total sums paid out by the personal injury 
system are very large and have an effect upon the economy as a whole. As a result, he 
argued, the amounts awarded depend to some extent upon what society can afford to 
pay the victim. By contrast, these considerations have little part to play when damages 
for defamation are assessed. 
 
4. INSURANCE AND STATUTE 
Insurers’ Lobbying and Influence upon Legislation 
A wide range of legislation going far beyond liability concerns can affect insurers. 
They formed their own trade association in 1917 partly in order to respond to potential 
changes in the law.
142
 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has since grown to 
such an extent that, with one exception, it is now more than twice the size of any other 
trade association.
143
 With an annual budget of over £20 million, it has been very 
effective in putting forward the industry’s point of view. The regulatory framework of 
insurance reflects the success of the ABI in arguing for forms of self-regulation in lieu 
of statutory controls, and for exemption from general legislation that might otherwise 
apply. The clearest example of this is the last minute exemption of insurance policies 
from domestic legislation dealing with control of unfair contract terms, a result 
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described by the former Director General of Fair Trading as “amazing.”144  Because of 
such influence, insurance remains the least regulated of contracts. 
An example of the ABI pressing its case in a forthright manner is where it issued a 
press release just before an appellate hearing was due to take place. In the release it 
threatened insurers’ withdrawal from a particular market in the event of the court 
finding liability.
145
 More effective has been its regular lobbying of government 
ministries. One insurance commentator has even suggested that, internationally, 
institutions such as the ABI “see themselves as governing governments.”146 In 
addition to lobbying ministries, the ABI has ensured that its case is heard in 
Parliament. Until 1997 one in ten Members of Parliament declared a financial link 
with the insurance industry,
147
 although this figure has been halved for the current 
Parliament.
148
 
The ABI is organised so as to respond to all government proposals to change the 
wide areas of law with which it is concerned. In 1998 the government announced that 
no proposal for regulation which has an impact upon businesses would be considered 
by ministers without a “regulatory impact assessment” being carried out. Rather than 
being just another bureaucratic requirement, the new procedures offer business and 
                                                 
144
 G. Borrie, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold Spirits and Timorous Souls 
(London: Stevens, 1984) 110. 
145
 Layard, “Insuring Pollution in the UK” [1996] Environmental Liability 17 at 18. 
146
 R. V. Ericson et al, Insurance as Governance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) at 151. 
See also R. V. Ericson and A. Doyle, Uncertain Business: Risk, Insurance and the Limits of 
Knowledge (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
147
 Clarke op cit 281.     
148
 The author's examination of the Register of Members' Interests in February 2004 revealed that only 
eight members of the House of Lords declared an insurance interest, one being membership of 
Lloyds. Only fifteen Members of Parliament declared any connection with insurance companies, 
although a further ten recorded that they were current members of Lloyds and nine others that they 
were former members.     
 44 
industry a major opportunity to influence the policy and legislative process.
149
 
Parliamentary Bills are now accompanied by impact statements assessing the financial 
costs and benefits of the measures being proposed. In drawing up such statements 
civil servants are directed to consult widely. Twenty or so bodies are specifically 
named, one of them being the ABI.
150
 As a result, it is automatic for the ABI to be 
asked to estimate the effect of proposed reforms on insurance premiums. Insurability 
is therefore now a relevant consideration whenever statutory changes affecting tort are 
being considered. Impact statements have given insurers a more formal and public 
opportunity to make representations to government, but it is doubtful whether this has 
given them much more influence than they had previously. This is because their most 
effective representations continue to be exercised in private, behind closed doors.
151
  
One illustration of the effectiveness of such private lobbying is the overturning of a 
Law Commission recommendation that a particular financial formula be used to set 
the discount rate in assessing damages. (This rate makes allowance for the investment 
return upon lump sum damages). In the Damages Act 1996 the Commission’s 
recommendation was replaced by a power given to the Lord Chancellor to change the 
rate as he saw fit. However, this discretionary power was not exercised for some time, 
and when a rate was eventually set it was less favourable to claimants than if the 
Commission’s formula had been used. The Opposition spokesman in Parliament noted 
that the change in the Act was “mightily convenient to the insurance industry” and 
commented that it was the result of “whispering in appropriate ears.”152 The 
effectiveness of this private lobbying is difficult to monitor, and has received only 
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limited attention from public lawyers. It reveals “a hidden dimension of the law which 
many lawyers may prefer to leave decently covered.”153 
Finally, we should note that insurers’ lobbying is partly responsible for the 
misleading portrayals of the tort system that appear in the media.
154
 Here there is 
space for but one example: insurers have been far too ready to assert that the periodic 
“crises” in premium rates are attributable to changes in tort law rather than structural 
factors within the industry itself.
155
 Insurers are responsible for much of the public’s 
perception of who benefits from our tort system and at what cost. The climate of 
reform is very much influenced by them, and in this respect the “compensation 
culture” debate has not been well informed.156 
The Influence of Insurance upon Particular Tort Statutes 
Statute has been affected not only by the lobbying of insurers on specific matters, 
but also, in a more general way, by developments in insurance provision. As with 
caselaw, it can be argued that new legislative rules reflect the tort system's ability to 
distribute the cost of injury via insurance. The influence has been said to be clearer in 
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relation to statute than caselaw.
157
 However, others might argue that among the 
relatively few statutes that deal directly with tort, there are examples of legislation, 
such as that dealing with occupier’s liability, which take little notice of the incidence 
or potential scope of liability insurance. 
By contrast, certain legislative measures can only be explained by reference to the 
insurance background. For example, one statute exempts from liability any mother 
causing injury to her unborn child. However, it is subject to an exception where the 
injury results from the mother’s negligent driving of a motor vehicle, and the mother 
then can be sued.
158
 Although this Act generally reflects a desire to prevent disputes 
among family members, its effect is limited in that one area where insurance against 
liability is compulsory. This exclusion of motor vehicle liability cannot merely be 
coincidental.  
Similarly the reform which abolished the rule which prevented actions between 
husbands and wives has been explained by the need to access insurance funds where a 
road accident had occurred.
159
 Under that legislation a stay of action may be ordered 
by a court where no substantial benefit would accrue to either husband or wife, the 
intention being that this power would be exercised in situations where no insurance 
existed. The spread of insurance provision is also said to account for a series of 
statutes which have expanded the scope of liability such as those enabling actions to 
be brought against the estates of deceased tortfeasors,
160
 dissolved companies,
161
 or by 
claimants who are partly at fault themselves.
162
 One statute familiar to all tort students 
explicitly takes insurance into account for it declares that, in determining whether a 
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notice is sufficient to exclude liability, the court must have regard to the availability of 
insurance.
163
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that insurance has had a profound effect upon tort and in 
particular upon the system of personal injury litigation. The influence of insurers upon 
the everyday practical operation of that system is readily apparent. In addition, they 
clearly have opportunity and regularly seek to influence the development of legislation 
affecting liability. Much more difficult to assess is the potential for insurance to affect 
the outcome of individual claims. Proving that the facts of cases have been moulded 
to fit the deeper pocket of insurers cannot be done by resort to the law reports alone, 
but it remains the suspicion of many a practitioner. Although it is easier to assess the 
influence of insurance upon the rules of tort, rather than the facts found in individual 
cases, the picture is by no means clear. On the one hand certain rules, such as those 
discussed in the statute section immediately above, clearly reflect the distributional 
consequences of insurance. In addition, if the focus changes from establishing liability 
to assessing damages the general influence may be more apparent. On the other hand, 
there remain large areas of tort law where the rules appear unaffected by insurance. 
The conclusion reached earlier in the article was that, at best, the influence of 
insurance upon the common law rules is only partial. Instead, it is with regard to the 
system as a whole - whether involving statutory or common law rules, fact finding, or 
everyday operation - that insurance can be seen as of vital importance. It is the 
lifeblood of the system. 
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